Pre-registrations (for Studies 2 and 3), materials, and data are available at <http://osf.io/j5vpe/>.

Introduction {#sec001}
============

Overprecision is overconfidence in the accuracy of one's beliefs \[[@pone.0227084.ref001]\]. This excessive certainty is on display when we are too sure we are right \[[@pone.0227084.ref002]\], when we believe we can forecast others' behavior \[[@pone.0227084.ref003]\], when doctors are too certain of a favored diagnosis \[[@pone.0227084.ref004]\], or when managers issue excessively precise and inaccurate earnings forecasts \[[@pone.0227084.ref005]\]. Frequent feedback should help people calibrate their confidence; being routinely wrong should reduce confidence in the next forecast. However, the robustness and durability of overprecision suggests this corrective may be incomplete \[[@pone.0227084.ref006], [@pone.0227084.ref001]\]. When their expectations prove wrong, people ought to be surprised. Are they? In this paper, we ask how overconfidence contributes to subsequent surprise.

Overprecision {#sec002}
-------------

There are innumerable ways in which overly certain beliefs can impair decisions. Overprecision contributes, for instance, to managers issuing too much debt when they underestimate the volatility of their firm's future \[[@pone.0227084.ref007]\], foregoing accounting corrections to their own forecasts of firm returns \[[@pone.0227084.ref008]\], and issuing excessively precise and inaccurate earnings forecasts \[[@pone.0227084.ref009], [@pone.0227084.ref005]\]. Those too sure of their beliefs will be more vulnerable to other biases, such as naïve realism \[[@pone.0227084.ref010]\] or the "false consensus" effect \[[@pone.0227084.ref011]\]. Excessive faith in their beliefs can also lead people to discount others' views \[[@pone.0227084.ref012]\], or even disparage others as biased \[[@pone.0227084.ref013]\]. Overprecision leads people to do too little to protect themselves against risks \[[@pone.0227084.ref014]\]. And overprecision blinds people to the need to consider other perspectives \[[@pone.0227084.ref015], [@pone.0227084.ref016]\]. These mistakes can have painful consequences for both individuals and organizations \[[@pone.0227084.ref017]\]. Given the costly consequences of overprecision, understanding its persistence is important.

We compare different measures of overprecision. Researchers have most often used the confidence interval paradigm employed by Alpert and Raiffa \[[@pone.0227084.ref018]\]. This method consistently finds overprecision \[[@pone.0227084.ref019]\], though it is controversial. The two most common critiques consider confidence intervals to be too difficult for participants to understand \[[@pone.0227084.ref020]\], and that people do not naturally think about confidence in terms of confidence intervals \[[@pone.0227084.ref014]\]. We directly compare the confidence interval method with more naturalistic measures of confidence in Study 2. In addition to confidence intervals, participants also reported how confident they felt on a 7-point scale (from "*Not at all confident*" to "*Extremely confident*"). This scale lacks an objective benchmark, but might nevertheless do a better job capturing subjective feelings of confidence. Study 3 invites participants to report how confident they are that the truth will be close their best guess. We intentionally vary our measures of confidence across studies in order to test the robustness of our results.

Study 1 asks participants how confident they are that the right answer is close to (within ten pounds of) their guess. Likewise, Study 3 asks participants to estimate the probability that their answer is correct. For these measures, overprecision would lead people to overestimate the chance that their answer is correct. These methods are simpler to explain and has the additional benefit that it elicits probabilities, which seem to be easier for people to understand and report than percentiles or confidence intervals \[[@pone.0227084.ref021]\]. We find that our key result is robust across the different elicitations used in the three studies.

We should also note that our approach requires us to designate some answers as correct, others as incorrect. Continuous response scales require setting the limbo bar at some particular height, above which responses are too far from the truth, and count as incorrect. Choosing where to set this bar will, to some extent, be arbitrary. While we are consistent within studies, between studies we employ different scales and different criteria. The consistency of the effects we document across these different accuracy criteria ought to contribute further to confidence in the reliability of the effects we document.

Surprise {#sec003}
--------

Surprise is one of the basic emotions \[[@pone.0227084.ref022]\]. Its functional role is to highlight erroneous predictions and to direct attention at the surprising stimulus \[[@pone.0227084.ref023], [@pone.0227084.ref024]\]. This function is sufficiently universal that surprise has proven useful in studying beliefs and expectations among monkeys and human infants \[[@pone.0227084.ref025], [@pone.0227084.ref026]\]. When something unexpected happens, it receives more attention and longer gaze. The level of surprise one experiences and the duration of subsequent gaze is positively correlated with the degree of difficulty making sense of an event \[[@pone.0227084.ref027]\]. Seeing someone levitate is more surprising than seeing them jump. The more unexpected an event, the more intense the emotional reaction to it \[[@pone.0227084.ref028]\].

The more confident one is of one's beliefs, the more surprising it should be when those beliefs turn out to be wrong. Given the ubiquity of overprecision in judgment, people should be surprised regularly. Here, we seek to connect the literature on surprise with the literature on overprecision in judgment. These literatures directly imply the hypothesis that predictions made with greater confidence will produce greater surprise when they turn out to be wrong. We test this prediction, and examine its consequences for the correction of subsequent confidence in judgment.

The literature on hindsight bias provides reason to think that surprise might be insufficiently responsive to outcomes that ought to be surprising \[[@pone.0227084.ref029]\]. The hindsight bias documents the tendency to incorrectly recall antecedent events so as to make outcomes as more predictable than they were. By selectively recalling outcome-consistent facts, people render those outcomes less surprising than they would otherwise be \[[@pone.0227084.ref030]\]. The hindsight bias might therefore inflate confidence ex-post and impede the potential for surprise to play a corrective role reducing confidence in subsequent predictions \[[@pone.0227084.ref031]\].

Present research {#sec004}
----------------

We asked participants to report ex-ante confidence for a variety of judgments, and after receiving performance feedback they then reported ex-post surprise at the result. This research hones in on a key interaction, wherein the relationship between ex-ante confidence and ex-post surprise is moderated by whether one's answer is correct. We present three studies examining this relationship. Study 1 examines the relationships between confidence, correctness, and surprise for both self and others. Study 2 exogenously manipulates confidence and replicates the key finding from the first study. Study 2 uses a different manipulation of confidence and employs a repeated-measures design to explore the temporal relationship between confidence and surprise. This longitudinal design allows us to examine the effect of surprise on subsequent confidence. That is, Study 2 asks whether surprise induced by being confident and wrong has the appropriate corrective effect of reducing subsequent confidence. Finally, Study 3 considers lay predictions regarding how surprised people believe they or others should be. Across the three studies, we employ a variety of different measures of belief precision and subsequent surprise, thereby testing their relationships with each other.

We report how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions, all conditions, and all measures. Pre-registrations (for Studies 2 and 3), materials, and data are available: <http://osf.io/j5vpe/>. The studies we report were reviewed and approved by the Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects at the University of California at Berkeley. All participants provided informed consent.

Study 1: Accuracy and surprise {#sec005}
==============================

Study 1 examined the basic relationship between surprise and overconfidence. We hypothesized that both confidence and correctness would positively predict surprise. We also computed a measure of absolute distance from the true answer as an additional predictor on surprise. We expected higher ex-ante confidence would produce lower ex-post surprise for correct judgments, and for incorrect judgments higher ex-ante confidence would produce greater ex-post surprise. Study 1 seeks the antecedents of surprise, by examining the effect of confidence, correctness, and distance from the truth on subsequent surprise.

Method {#sec006}
------

We obtained complete responses from 446 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers \[[@pone.0227084.ref032]\] who were located in the United States and with at least 95% approval rates. (An additional 141 failed to complete the survey, most because they failed an attention check.) We selected our sample size ex-ante, guided by the results of several pilot studies, and did not analyze the data until collection was complete.

After obtaining consent, the survey presented instructions followed by an attention check. The survey ejected those who failed the attention check. Remaining participants then saw five photographs of strangers. These photographs, showing the target individuals wearing exactly the clothing they were wearing when they were weighed, showed their full bodies. Participants had to guess the weight and respond to the question, "How likely is it that you have estimated the weight correctly within 10 pounds? Move the slider to indicate your level of confidence (0 means no chance, 100 means absolutely certain)." After each of the five images, participants saw the true weight of each target in turn, followed by truthful feedback on whether or not their estimate fell within ten pounds of the actual weight. Following each round of feedback, participants reported their surprise on a scale of 0--100.

We did not collect any demographic information on participants in Study 1.

A survey programming error led to 29 rounds (1.3% of the 2230 total) for 24 participants in which the survey informed them that their answers were correct when they were not. The results below exclude these problematic rounds, but results are not meaningfully different when they are included.

Results and discussion {#sec007}
----------------------

Results reveal participants to be overprecise: The average hit rate for estimates within ten pounds of the true weight was 36%, yet average confidence was 66% (*SD* = 20.8%). Given the repeated measures design, we employed a multilevel regression model with random slopes. We measured distance as the absolute value of the difference between the participants' estimates and the true weight of the person in the photograph.

We conducted a multilevel regression predicting surprise from absolute distance, correctness, confidence, and the interaction between correctness and confidence, all nested at the individual level. The results reveal that absolute distance did indeed positively predict participants' reported surprise, *B* = .25, *t* = 6.23, *p* \< .001. There were also significant main effects of confidence and correctness on surprise. Greater ex-ante confidence predicted greater ex-post surprise, *B* = .61, *t* = 17.24, *p* \< .001. Being correct was also associated with greater surprise, *B* = 57.02, *t* = 15.26, *p* \< .001. These main effects are qualified by a significant confidence-correctness interaction wherein greater ex-ante confidence was associated with lower ex-post surprise when participants learned their guesses were correct, *B* = -1.27, *t* = -24.14, *p* \< .001.

We next compared correct and incorrect answers by analyzing them with separate multilevel regressions. When participants were incorrect, more ex-ante confidence increased ex-post surprise, *B* = .61, *t* = 16.70, *p* \< .001, and greater absolute distance from the truth also produced greater surprise, *B* = .24, *t* = 5.79, *p* \< .001. When participants were correct, confidence predicted less surprise, *B* = -.63, *t* = -14.85, *p* \< .001. However, distance from the truth was not significant, *B* = .09, *t* = .42, *p* = .67.

These results show that being confident and wrong is associated with greater surprise. However, this study is correlational in nature, leaving open the possibility that some third variable leads to both confidence and surprise. The next study employs an alternative measure of confidence and provides an experimental test of the effects of confidence on surprise using a longitudinal design. As we shall see, Studies 2 and 3 replicate the key results of Study 1.

Study 2: Surprise over time {#sec008}
===========================

Study 2 sought to replicate Study 1's results in a different domain while expanding our scope to two new facets of investigation. Specifically, we examined how aleatory or epistemic questions could affect the relationship between confidence and surprise. Because people are more confident when uncertainty is epistemic than when it is aleatory \[[@pone.0227084.ref033]\], this manipulation served as an experimental manipulation of confidence.

Ten questions were aleatory in nature, where the answer could not be known beforehand: What number ball would be drawn from the bingo cage? The other ten weight-guessing questions were epistemic in nature, with answers that participants could conceivably know, given sufficient skill at weight-guessing.

Study 2 assessed confidence by asking participants to report their confidence on a seven-point scale. In addition, participants reported a 50% confidence interval---the interquartile range, demarcated by the 25^th^ and 75^th^ percentiles of their subjective probability distribution. Conceptually, these different measures all assess subjective certainty---the concentration of a subjective probability distribution. Greater certainty is reflected in an SPD more tightly concentrated around the best guess. They are useful tools for testing the degree to which the effect we identify depends on the specifics of the way confidence is elicited and generalizing our results.

In addition, Study 2 sought to examine the temporal dynamics of confidence and surprise. Does experience help people adjust their expectations and better calibrate their confidence? Does it reduce surprise? We provided our participants with immediate feedback and measured the consequences of that feedback (reported surprise) on their subsequent reports of confidence.

Method {#sec009}
------

Our pre-registered research plan called for 115 participants recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk, restricted to workers in the United States with at least a 90% approval rate. We based this number on the effect size from a previous study (available in our supplemental online materials), f^2^ = .036, and power of 90%. Participants averaged 35 years old (SD = 11.2 years). The majority of participants (74%) identified as white, 8% as Asian, 11% as African American, 6% as Hispanic, and 1% as Native American. Most (85%) had at least some college experience and 56% had completed at least a four-year college degree. The majority (63%) identified as female.

Study 2 asked each participant for 20 estimates; half aleatory and half epistemic. We randomized, between subjects, both the order of these two question blocks as well as the order of questions within each block. Our operationalization of aleatory questions came in the form of drawing bingo balls numbered from 1 to 100. Our epistemic questions asked participants to guess weights from photographs (as in Study 1). For each estimate, we asked participants to provide a best guess of the answer, as well as high and low bounds to establish a confidence interval: first, "a number so [**low**]{.ul} that you believe there is only a 25% chance the true weight \[or actual bingo ball\] falls below it" and also "a number so [**high**]{.ul} that you believe there is only a 25% chance the true weight \[or actual bingo ball\] falls above it." These interquartile ranges also defined which answers were considered 'correct' (i.e. whether the true answer was inside or outside of their self-created 'confidence' interval). Participants provided three responses per round: a best guess plus high and low bounds, at the 25^th^ and 75^th^ percentiles, to form a 50% confidence interval. We used a standardized measure of the size of participants' confidence intervals (their high estimate minus their low estimate divided by their 'best guess' estimate) as a confidence measure. In addition, we asked, "How confident are you that the actual bingo ball number about to be pulled will fall within this range?" on a scale from 1 (*Not at all confident*) to 7 (*Extremely confident*).

In addition, participants reported confidence on a 1 to 7 scale (from "*Not at all confident*" to "*Extremely confident*"). After learning the right answer, participants reported surprise on a 1--7 scale (from "*Not at all surprised*" to "*Extremely surprised*").

Results and discussion {#sec010}
----------------------

Hit rates between the 25^th^ and 75^th^ percentiles were similar for aleatory (65.83%) and epistemic questions (68.78%), *t*(114) = -1.51, *p* = .13. These hit rates suggest that participants were actually underprecise for both bingo ball questions and weight guessing questions, as both hit rates are greater than the 50% expected to hit in the interquartile range. However, the bingo rounds produced lower feelings of confidence (*M* = 4.82, *SD* = 1.85) than did the weight rounds (*M* = 5.42, *SD* = 1.38), *t*(114) = -8.83, *p* \< .001.

The effects of confidence and correctness on surprise replicate the results of Study 1: when incorrect, high confidence predicted *higher* ex-post surprise; though when correct, higher confidence predicted *lower* ex-post surprise. This result emerges from a multilevel regression predicting surprise with question type, correctness, distance, confidence, and a correctness-confidence interaction. There was a main effect of question type: the epistemic weight-guessing questions elicited greater surprise (*M* = 3.40, *SD* = 1.91) than the aleatory bingo ball questions (*M* = 2.71, *SD* = 2.15), *B* = .63, *t* = 9.63, *p* \< .001. This analysis also replicated the confidence-correctness interaction from previous studies, *B* = -.96, *t* = -23.52, *p* \< .001. This interaction arises because confidence increased surprise only following incorrect answers. Subsetting on correctness identifies the negative relationship between confidence and surprise when correct, *B* = -.34, *t* = -12.89, *p* \< .001, and the positive relationship between confidence and surprise when incorrect, *B* = .43, *t* = 9.37, *p* \< .001. See [Fig 1](#pone.0227084.g001){ref-type="fig"}.

![The aggregated standardized interaction effect of confidence and correct answers on reported ex-post surprise, for Studies 1--3.\
Measures are standardized by z-scoring using the grand mean within each study, then aggregating.](pone.0227084.g001){#pone.0227084.g001}

However, our other measure of confidence (confidence interval size) produces different results. The same multilevel model predicting surprise with question type, correctness, distance, and confidence (from interval size), produces a correctness-confidence interaction, *B* = -.96, *t* = 5.16, *p* \< .001. Again to seek clearer insights, we ran this new model on data subsetted by correctness. The negative relationship between confidence and surprise for correct answers is weakened to nonsignificance, *B* = -.02 *t* = -1.55, *p* = .12. The positive relationship we found previously between confidence and surprise when incorrect is nearly nonexistent, *B* = .04, *t* = 0.59, *p* = .56.

The relationship between confidence interval size and self-reported confidence is not intuitive for participants. Confidence interval size was correlated with self-reported confidence at *r* = .28, *p \<* .001. This suggests that as intervals grew (implying lower confidence), self-reported confidence also increased---a contradictory pattern. Puzzlingly, this correlation between CI size and scale confidence only exists with incorrect answers, *r* = .30, *p* \< .001, the correlation is nonsignificant for correct answers, *r* = .05, n.s. This is intriguing as both measures of confidence are reported prior to participants learning the correct answer.

This study's repeated-measures design allowed us to test the effect of surprise on confidence over time. We employed a lagged regression to see how confidence is predicted by correctness at *t*-- 1 (i.e., how correctness in any given round predicts confidence in the round immediately following). Lagged correctness at *t*-- 1 significantly predicted confidence at time *t*, *B* = .25, *t* = 4.12, p \< .001. In other words, participants expanded their confidence intervals after having been wrong. Did reported surprise impact subsequent confidence similar to how correctness affected subsequent confidence? Adding lagged surprise at *t*-- 1 into the same model showed no significant effect of lagged surprise on confidence, *B* = .002, *t* = 0.13, *p* = .89. This result suggests a profound failure of the functional role of surprise: it did not reduce subsequent confidence. The inclusion of lagged surprise also left the main effect of lagged correctness on surprise nearly unchanged, *B* = .26, *t* = 3.78, *p* \< .001.

Results of Study 2 introduce important caveats to our key interaction between confidence and correctness on reported surprise. The results reinforce the importance of the method one uses to elicit confidence, as our key results largely disappear using the confidence-interval elicitation. This might be attributable to the difficulties people have setting confidence intervals. For instance, people set 50% confidence about as wide as they set 98% confidence intervals, despite the fact that 98% confidence intervals should be much wider \[[@pone.0227084.ref034]\]. These results add to our skepticism of confidence-interval measures and the degree to which they effectively capture subjective feelings of confidence. However, there is another possibility: Because two effects may have cancelled each other out: (1) more confident people were more surprised at being wrong but (2) people who gave wider intervals (i.e. those less confident) were more surprised that their larger intervals did *not* contain the right answer. This ambiguity interpreting confidence interval measures led us to abandon confidence interval elicitations in Study 3.

Study 3: Predicting surprise {#sec011}
============================

Study 3 asks whether people are as surprised as they *should* be. Lacking an normative benchmark for degree of surprise, we pre-registered a plan that asked a subset of participants how surprised they thought they ought to be. Anticipating that simply asking the question might influence subsequent reports, the study randomly assigned half the participants to a prediction condition which elicited predictions of surprise. The other half of participants, in the control condition, made no such predictions. Study 3 again employed both aleatory and epistemic judgments.

In choosing which tasks to use, we noted that Study 2 found surprise to be lower for bingo balls than weight-guessing. Since the distribution of bingo balls is uniform, all numbers are equally likely and there is little reason to be surprised by any particular outcome, potentially contributing to diminished "surprisingness." Therefore, Study 3 replaces bingo ball draws with a set of ten coin flips, which has a single-peaked distribution of outcomes and the potential for truly surprising outcomes (such as ten flips all coming up tails).

Method {#sec012}
------

A power analysis of the prior studies, in which people reported ex ante surprise, providing average effect sizes of f^2^ = .036 to f^2^ = .024 and a recommended sample size of 105. Wary of losing power from subsetting the data in testing our hypotheses, we pre-registered a sample size of 150 and ended up with 151 participants (64% female). We restricted participation to Amazon Mechanical Turk workers in the United States with at least a 90% approval rate and 50 approved work assignments. Participants averaged 36.4 years old (SD = 11.4 years). The majority of participants (78%) identified as white, 9% as Asian, 5% as African American, 5% as Hispanic, 2% as Native American, and 1% as other. Most (84%) had at least some college experience and 50% had completed at least a four-year college degree.

Each survey informed participants that there would be two trial blocks: ten rounds of ten coin flips each and ten rounds of guessing individuals' weights from images. For each of the two blocks (which were presented in a random order) participants provided a best guess estimate and reported their confidence in that estimate (on a 1--100 scale with endpoints labeled "Not at all confident" and "Extremely confident"). In the coin-flip rounds, the question read "How confident are you that the actual number of heads for this next round will be within 1 of your of your guess?" In the weight-guessing rounds, the question read "How confident are you that the actual answer for this image will be within 10 pounds of your of your guess?" Following each round, we truthfully informed participants whether they had answered correctly. Then participants responded to the question, "How surprised are you at the actual number of heads for this round?" or "How surprised are you that the actual person's weight is \[x\] pounds?" (on a 1--7 scale with endpoints labeled "Not at all surprised" and "Extremely surprised"). Answers for coin flips counted as correct if they were within one head (out of ten) of the actual outcome. Weight guesses counted as correct if they were within ten pounds of the truth.

We assigned participants to one of two between-subjects conditions: a control condition and a prediction condition, where, in each round, in addition to the procedure described above, participants predicted how surprised they would be if their answer was right and if it was wrong:

"How surprised would you be if your answer for this next round was *correct*?" and

"How surprised would you be if your answer for this next round was *wrong*?" They responded on a 1 to 7 scale.

Results and discussion {#sec013}
----------------------

On average, participants were overconfident. They report being 55.5% confident on average, but they are only right 50.3% of the time, one-sample *t*(2804) = 12.1, *p* \< .001. This confidence declines with experience. It starts at 60.2% in Round 1 and declines to 52.8% in Round 20. A linear regression predicting confidence with round number, coin/weight, and fixed effects for subject produces a strong effect of round, *B* = -.59, *t* = -5.08, *p* \< .001. There is no significant difference in expressed confidence between weight and coin rounds, *B* = -1.55, *t* = -1.16, *p* = .25. This lack of a difference between weight and coin rounds is remarkable given that participants' guesses are correct 61% of the time for coin rounds but only 39.8% of the time for weight rounds, *t*(3038) = 11.83, *p* \< .001.

Were participants as surprised as they predicted they should be? In order to test this, we employed two paired t-tests to account for the repeated measures design, comparing (1) the predicted surprise for a correct answer to a subsequent correct answer's surprise, and (2) the predicted surprise for an incorrect answer to a subsequent incorrect answer's surprise. We see that participants reported less surprise (*M* = 3.30, *SD* = 1.91) than they predicted they would (*M* = 3.78, *SD* = 1.82) when correct, *t*(712) = 7.63, *p* \< .001. Conversely, they were more surprised *(M* = 4.77, *SD* = 1.82) than predicted (*M* = 3.61, *SD* = 1.74) when incorrect, *t*(761) = -15.56, *p* \< .001. These patterns are similar for both coin and weight rounds.

We also explored whether the mere act of prediction had an impact on one's subsequent surprise. We employed a repeated measures one-way ANOVA predicting ex-post surprise by condition, controlling for individual-level error. This analysis shows that condition significantly predicts ex-post surprise, *F*(1, 2888) = 19.41, *p* \< .001. A follow up hierarchical linear regression controlling for individual-level error shows that being in the prediction condition increased ex-post reported surprise, *B* = 0.65, *t* = 4.27, *p* \< .001. Those who predicted their surprise wound up reporting more surprise (*M* = 4.04, *SD* = 2.01) than those who did not (*M* = 3.39, *SD* = 2.04).

In testing a replication of the lagged analysis from Study 2 we ran a similar lagged analysis predicting confidence with correctness at *t*-- 1. The analysis shows that when it was the only predictor, lagged correctness positively predicted subsequent confidence, *B* = .05, *t* = 3.29, *p* \< .005. However, including lagged surprise wipes out the relationship, leaving only lagged surprise significant, *B* = -0.10, *t* = -4.72, *p* \< .001, where more surprise at *t*-1 led to less confidence at *t*. This contrasts with the result from in Study 2. Nevertheless, results from Study 3 do indeed document the corrective effect by which surprise reduces subsequent confidence.

General discussion {#sec014}
==================

Our results show that ex-ante confidence and ex-post surprise are inextricably linked. Our primary finding, as shown in [Fig 1](#pone.0227084.g001){ref-type="fig"} and [Table 1](#pone.0227084.t001){ref-type="table"}, is that when people are correct, greater ex-ante confidence produces less ex-post surprise, whereas when they are incorrect, greater ex-ante confidence produces more ex-post surprise. We examine the psychology underlying these relationships and identify moderators that can either suppress or enhance their strength. Studies 1 and 2 establish the link between confidence and surprise, highlighting that correctness is a powerful moderator of the relationship. Studies 2 and 3 employ exogenous manipulations of confidence; their results replicate the correlational results of Study 1. Study 2 finds more powerful confidence-correctness interaction effects on surprise for epistemic questions than for aleatory, consistent with the notion that feeling personally accountable for knowing or not knowing the answer increases the intensity of emotional reactions to being right or wrong. Study 3 finds that people are more surprised about being wrong than they expect to be.

10.1371/journal.pone.0227084.t001

###### Means for confidence and surprise, conditional on correctness, in the three studies.

![](pone.0227084.t001){#pone.0227084.t001g}

                        Ex-ante confidence   Ex-post surprise   Confidence-surprise correlation (r)
  --------------------- -------------------- ------------------ -----------------------------------------------
  Study 1                                                       
      Weights--right    66.3% (20.7%)        28.6 (28.1)        -.47[\*\*\*](#t001fn003){ref-type="table-fn"}
      Weights--wrong    65.7% (20.5%)        60.6 (28.9)        .45[\*\*\*](#t001fn003){ref-type="table-fn"}
  Study 2                                                       
      Bingo--right      5.23 (1.82)          2.40 (1.75)        -.43[\*\*\*](#t001fn003){ref-type="table-fn"}
      Bingo--wrong      4.03 (1.66)          3.31 (2.06)        .45[\*\*\*](#t001fn003){ref-type="table-fn"}
      Weights--right    5.50 (1.38)          2.42 (1.61)        -.38[\*\*\*](#t001fn003){ref-type="table-fn"}
      Weights--wrong    5.25 (1.37)          5.57 (1.52)        .11[\*](#t001fn002){ref-type="table-fn"}
  Study 3                                                       
      Coins--right      55.3% (25.2%)        2.62 (1.73)        -.18[\*\*\*](#t001fn003){ref-type="table-fn"}
      Coins--wrong      54.9% (25.9%)        4.20 (2.00)        .21[\*\*\*](#t001fn003){ref-type="table-fn"}
      Weights--right    49.7% (26.0%)        3.17 (1.93)        -.37[\*\*\*](#t001fn003){ref-type="table-fn"}
      Weights---wrong   46.9% (27.1%)        4.87 (1.71)        .09

Standard deviations in parentheses. The right-most column shows the correlation (r) between confidence and surprise.

\*p \< .05

\*\*\*p \< .001

We must note the idiosyncratic nature of the laboratory contexts in which we conducted our experiments. They were designed more for experimental control and causal identification than for their similarity to any particular field context. It is possible that the higher stakes associated with some life events might facilitate learning. After eating a surprisingly spicy pepper, people's confidence taking the next pepper might be shaken. On the other hand, religious adherents' certainty does not always adjust downward when prophesied events fail to occur \[[@pone.0227084.ref035], [@pone.0227084.ref001]\]. As stakes increase, it is possible that ego-protection may impede the learning process. Testing the effect of different incentives is a potentially fruitful avenue for future research. Such research will have to grapple with the complex array of incentives, psychological, pecuniary, and interpersonal, attached to judgments, forecasts, social displays, and self-perception.

What of the utility of surprise? Surprise, as one of the basic emotions, serves a powerful and fundamental role stimulating curiosity and directing attention \[[@pone.0227084.ref022], [@pone.0227084.ref024]\]. If surprise reflects prediction error, individuals should seek to maximize accuracy and minimize surprise \[[@pone.0227084.ref036]\]. This implies that surprise should lead people to reduce their subsequent confidence. Our results suggest that surprise does not always play this functional role, or that it is difficult to measure consistently. Future research should examine the conditions under which surprise has a corrective effect on subsequent confidence. The results of Study 3 suggest that anticipating what would constitute a surprising outcome may help reduce the degree to which the hindsight bias allows people to persuade themselves that they knew it all along (see \[[@pone.0227084.ref037], [@pone.0227084.ref038]\]). How quickly does this effect decay and what possible moderators could increase the calibrating power and longevity of feedback on subsequent confidence? Could incorrect answers in epistemic domains more central to one's self-concept 'stick' for a longer period of time, forcing one's re-evaluation of their believed expertise? Or could the opposite be the case, where the incorrect answer is considered anomalous and the sense of expertise persists? These are questions for future research.

We aspired to measure the effects of overprecision on surprise. In recording participants' ex-ante confidence, their correctness, and their ex-post surprise, we document consistent evidence suggesting that people expect to be correct. If they go into a decision with confidence, they are more surprised to be incorrect, and less surprised when correct. We believe these results do more than underscore precision in judgment. Rather, this research approaches the topic with a new paradigm that serves to reveal another layer in the scientific understanding of the psychology of confidence and precision in judgment.

10.1371/journal.pone.0227084.r001
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We would appreciate receiving your revised manuscript by Apr 11 2020 11:59PM. When you are ready to submit your revision, log on to <https://www.editorialmanager.com/pone/> and select the \'Submissions Needing Revision\' folder to locate your manuscript file.

If you would like to make changes to your financial disclosure, please include your updated statement in your cover letter.

To enhance the reproducibility of your results, we recommend that if applicable you deposit your laboratory protocols in protocols.io, where a protocol can be assigned its own identifier (DOI) such that it can be cited independently in the future. For instructions see: <http://journals.plos.org/plosone/s/submission-guidelines#loc-laboratory-protocols>

Please include the following items when submitting your revised manuscript:

A rebuttal letter that responds to each point raised by the academic editor and reviewer(s). This letter should be uploaded as separate file and labeled \'Response to Reviewers\'.A marked-up copy of your manuscript that highlights changes made to the original version. This file should be uploaded as separate file and labeled \'Revised Manuscript with Track Changes\'.An unmarked version of your revised paper without tracked changes. This file should be uploaded as separate file and labeled \'Manuscript\'.

Please note while forming your response, if your article is accepted, you may have the opportunity to make the peer review history publicly available. The record will include editor decision letters (with reviews) and your responses to reviewer comments. If eligible, we will contact you to opt in or out.

We look forward to receiving your revised manuscript.

Kind regards,

Philipp D. Koellinger, Ph.D.

Academic Editor

PLOS ONE

Additional Editor Comments (if provided):

Both reviewers provided excellent, in-depth comments on your study. The internal validity of your results is obviously a \"sine qua non\", and many of the comments by R2 are essential in this regard. I also share R1\'s concerns about the external validity of your results, but this is a much more difficult goal to achieve. If additional data collection would be possible to address R1\'s concerns, that would be fantastic. At a minimum, please include a thorough discussion of the potential limits to the external validity of your results.

Journal Requirements:

When submitting your revision, we need you to address these additional requirements.

1\. Please ensure that your manuscript meets PLOS ONE\'s style requirements, including those for file naming. The PLOS ONE style templates can be found at

<http://www.journals.plos.org/plosone/s/file?id=wjVg/PLOSOne_formatting_sample_main_body.pdf> and <http://www.journals.plos.org/plosone/s/file?id=ba62/PLOSOne_formatting_sample_title_authors_affiliations.pdf>

\[Note: HTML markup is below. Please do not edit.\]

Reviewers\' comments:

Reviewer\'s Responses to Questions

**Comments to the Author**

1\. Is the manuscript technically sound, and do the data support the conclusions?

The manuscript must describe a technically sound piece of scientific research with data that supports the conclusions. Experiments must have been conducted rigorously, with appropriate controls, replication, and sample sizes. The conclusions must be drawn appropriately based on the data presented.

Reviewer \#1: Yes

Reviewer \#2: Partly

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

2\. Has the statistical analysis been performed appropriately and rigorously?

Reviewer \#1: Yes

Reviewer \#2: I Don\'t Know

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

3\. Have the authors made all data underlying the findings in their manuscript fully available?

The [PLOS Data policy](http://www.plosone.org/static/policies.action#sharing) requires authors to make all data underlying the findings described in their manuscript fully available without restriction, with rare exception (please refer to the Data Availability Statement in the manuscript PDF file). The data should be provided as part of the manuscript or its supporting information, or deposited to a public repository. For example, in addition to summary statistics, the data points behind means, medians and variance measures should be available. If there are restrictions on publicly sharing data---e.g. participant privacy or use of data from a third party---those must be specified.

Reviewer \#1: Yes

Reviewer \#2: Yes

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

4\. Is the manuscript presented in an intelligible fashion and written in standard English?

PLOS ONE does not copyedit accepted manuscripts, so the language in submitted articles must be clear, correct, and unambiguous. Any typographical or grammatical errors should be corrected at revision, so please note any specific errors here.

Reviewer \#1: Yes

Reviewer \#2: Yes

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

5\. Review Comments to the Author

Please use the space provided to explain your answers to the questions above. You may also include additional comments for the author, including concerns about dual publication, research ethics, or publication ethics. (Please upload your review as an attachment if it exceeds 20,000 characters)

Reviewer \#1: Review for the paper entitled 'Overprecision increases subsequent surprise'

Thank you for letting me review this exciting and relevant paper. I believe the authors have investigated a relevant topic in three rigorous studies. Their results show that overprecision increases surprise and reduces subsequent confidence. Although I think this research is important I have some concerns before the results can be published.

Major concerns:

1\. My most important concern about the results that are reported in this paper is their external validity. All studies use abstract tasks to measure overprecision and I am not convinced that the results would hold for decisions that have personal consequences for the decision-maker. People in your studies had no incentive to guess the weight of people right. However, people who make overprecise predictions about their future income will experience personal consequences of this judgment. Similarly, managers who have to predict financial losses of their firm will probably experience personal consequences of a wrong judgment. Having said that, I also guess that people will put more thought into judgments that have personal consequences for them which will affect their subsequent surprise. Hence, before I can trust the presented results, I would like to see their external validity and see if this "sensible pattern" holds for (more) realistic settings.

2\. You state that "When something unexpected happens, it receives more attention and longer gaze \[...\]." As most people are uncertainty averse, they try to avoid or diminish uncertainty or the unexpected. Hence, I would argue that people would like to engage in deliberate consideration, especially for epistemic questions, to exactly avoid to be surprised for situations of personal relevance. In your weight guessing task, some people might not think systematically about cues that would give them the correct answer, but would just make guesses based on unspecific cues. Did you check participants' time to give their answers or ask them about how they guessed the weight of the strangers?

3\. Can you really compare the tasks of your studies? The probability distributions in the three tasks used is very different and I guess surprise is lower when you are correct in a coin flip compared to when you are correct in the bingo task or the weight guessing task. Similarly, you measure overprecision AND surprise differently. Why did you use 1-100 in Study 1 and 1 to 7 scales in Study 2 to measure suprise? Why did you not use the surprise subscale from PANAS-X? Related to that, your study design seems quite straightforward; is it possible that participants guessed the purpose of the study and give answers that conform with your hypotheses? Did you ask participants if they knew about the purpose of the study (and control for that)? Although I am no opponent of using MTurk for data collection, it would be interesting to describe your samples in a bit more detail (gender, age, ethnicity, profession etc.) and possibly also include some control variables in your analyses (at least in Study 1 because it is correlational).

4\. I am missing some explanations why surprise does not reduce overprecision. Why should we care that overprecision leads to surprise if we don't know which consequences surprise has for overprecision or any other (personally relevant) decision? It is possible that not surprise, but another emotion, for example, regret, could be a corrective to reduce overprecision. People may want to avoid feeling regret when finding out that their initial judgment was wrong and regret anticipation could reduce overprecision. This is just an hypothesis, but it would be interesting to test this (in a realistic setting).

Minor comments:

1\. A more detailed overview of how overprecision is measured in extant research would be helpful in judging if you apply and compare the relevant measures for overprecision.

2\. Did the photographs show the full body or only faces?

3\. In Study 2, you used 10 questions per domain? Did you (quasi) randomize the questions or blocks of questions?

Reviewer \#2: Overall

The idea that greater confidence will produce greater surprise (if incorrect) would seem to be a fairly intuitive thing. The manuscript in its current form doesn't seem to build a very strong rationale for the research other than nobody else has done it before. Arguably, however, a number of studies in the hindsight bias literature have already demonstrated the relationship being tested in this paper (e.g., Ash, 2009; Choi & Nisbett, 2000; Pezzo, 2003). In these studies participants predict the likelihood of an outcome; those whose predictions were most "off" were found to be most surprised. Inherent in a likelihood judgment is a statement of confidence. If person A predicts a 90% chance that the home team will win, she is more confident than person B who predicts only a 60% chance. As such she will be more surprised if the team loses. The authors' use of distance of participants' estimate from the true value as a measure of confidence is consistent with this idea. (Note however, that hindsight bias per se can get convoluted and doesn't always give the mirror image of surprise). In any case, the manuscript would benefit from an expanded introductory section on the extant literature on surprise, including some of the work by Rainer Reisenzein, mention the hindsight literature, and how this research moves beyond that, and should address theoretical differences between their different measures of confidence.

STUDY 1

Study 1 has some inconsistencies in its data reporting. The manuscript says N = 430, but t-tests give 451 degrees of freedom. The data set provided on the OSF website is a "tall" data set (typical of multilevel modeling) with what should be 5 rows per subject. However, the total number of rows (N = 2240) divided by 5 = 448. A quick check of unique IDs also yields 448. Also, 6 of the 2240 rows have missing data. Finally, the manuscript says that 37% of the guesses were correct (which is consistent with the OSF data set), but the supplemental material says 35%. These inconsistencies need to be cleared up.

A much bigger problem is that the column marked "correct" in the OSF data set is not consistent with the description in the method. The method says that a guess was marked correct if it was within 10lbs of the actual weight. Although the actual weights aren't shown in the data set, we would expect the range of guesses that are correct (for any given photograph) to be 20lbs (i.e., +/- 10 lbs). Assuming that everyone saw the same photo in a given "round" (I confirmed this by examining the Qualtrics survey) here are the highest and lowest weight guesses for each of the five pictures. Remember, these are just from people marked correct in the OSF data set:

Round 1: Low guess = 150, High guess = 265

Round 2: Low guess = 120, High guess = 210

Round 3: Low guess = 95, High guess = 170

Round 4: Low guess = 120, High guess = 195

Round 5: Low guess = 105, High guess = 180

Clearly something is amiss here. No matter what the true weights are, these all have ranges much greater than 20lbs. As a double check, I inspected everyone, including those who were marked incorrect, and the ranges get even larger (as would be expected), and include some clear typos (e.g., weight estimates below 50lbs). I don't see anything in the supplemental materials about cleaning any of this data.

I found the true weights in the Qualtrics survey and recalculated the correctness variable. Of the 2240 cases 35.9% were marked correct, but and most important, the original and the newly calculated "correct" columns are completely unrelated (kappa = .09).

The good news is that when you calculate the correlation between surprise and confidence (broken down by correctness, and using the proper "correct" variable), the simple bivariate correlations make a heck of a lot more sense:

r (incorrect) = .40 r (correct) = - 39. Exactly as you would expect.

STUDIES 2 and 3

The data sets for Studies 2 and 3 seem fine, near as I can tell (although I did not look closely). The method for all three studies should be fleshed out more (e.g., exact wording of the confidence interval question). I found myself often having to refer to the supplemental materials for basic information. The existing method section also has some unnecessary repetition that can be removed to make room for more of these details.

Overall, the presentation of the results is somewhat disorganized. A number of results are presented outside the context of the multilevel modeling and then again repeated within the modeling context (e.g., the main effect of question type). For example, at the top of p.10 a breakdown of the correct x confidence interaction is given before mentioning the interaction (and before mentioning MLM). Then the interaction is mentioned, and then essentially the same breakdown is given (with the exact same results and p-values repeated!). All three studies suffer from this problem. I think the manuscript would benefit from inclusion of a complete table with the results of all analyses in each study

Does distance from the true value (or confidence) treated as an individual difference variable (averaged across the 5 pictures for any given person) predict surprise at level 2? I think you can examine cross level interactions as well. Since you are using a random slopes approach (which I assume you tested for, and again should report) you might as well see what predicts the slope for any given person by examining level 2 predictors.

Study 2 uses a very different criterion for correctness (50% confidence interval) vs that of Studies 1 and 3 ("Is the given answer within +/- 10 lbs of the correct answer"), and the implications are never really discussed in the manuscript. In Study 3, the criterion for correct guessing of quarter flips seems a bit arbitrary. A "pilot" test could determine how many flips "off" most students would require before they considered their guess to be wrong. In general I wonder if the participants would agree with the definition of correctness and if there are individual differences. At least discuss this.

From supplemental material (p. 2) "Our main hypothesis was that the distance of the participants' estimate from the true weight would predict their reported surprise, even when being correct was factored in to the model." I thought the interaction with correctness was the key prediction. This sounds like a main effect which is not what you\'re predicting.

Further, the title suggests that it is overprecision (which I thought - perhaps incorrectly - always required the use of a confidence interval) was key, not distance, and of course, there is the more standard "how confident are you?" rating. The manuscript doesn't distinguish between these 3 in any important theoretical way.

It is confusing to include Figure 1 in its current location. It is also referenced following a sentence that doesn't seem to apply: "The greater the distance between guesses and the truth, the more surprise they reported, β= .77, t(380) = 7.20, p\< .001. See Figure 1." Figure 1 predicts surprise from confidence, not distance of the guess from truth. Further, it says that the values are standardized "by z-scoring within each study" Are these z-scores based on the grand mean or on each individual across the five trials? The latter might cause issues by making a person whose lowest surprise rating was 20 comparable to a person whose lowest surprise rating was, say 60.

The manuscript should probably include inclusion exclusion criteria for mTurk. Number of HITS, % approved, did you restrict identical (mTurk) IDs, did you check for identical GeoLocation (it's a pain, but particularly if you required a low \#HITs and low approval rating (e.g., 90% or lower), you can get a lot of garbage.

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

6\. PLOS authors have the option to publish the peer review history of their article ([what does this mean?](https://journals.plos.org/plosone/s/editorial-and-peer-review-process#loc-peer-review-history)). If published, this will include your full peer review and any attached files.

If you choose "no", your identity will remain anonymous but your review may still be made public.

**Do you want your identity to be public for this peer review?** For information about this choice, including consent withdrawal, please see our [Privacy Policy](https://www.plos.org/privacy-policy).

Reviewer \#1: Yes: Prof. Dr. Theresa Treffers

Reviewer \#2: No

\[NOTE: If reviewer comments were submitted as an attachment file, they will be attached to this email and accessible via the submission site. Please log into your account, locate the manuscript record, and check for the action link \"View Attachments\". If this link does not appear, there are no attachment files to be viewed.\]

While revising your submission, please upload your figure files to the Preflight Analysis and Conversion Engine (PACE) digital diagnostic tool, <https://pacev2.apexcovantage.com/>. PACE helps ensure that figures meet PLOS requirements. To use PACE, you must first register as a user. Registration is free. Then, login and navigate to the UPLOAD tab, where you will find detailed instructions on how to use the tool. If you encounter any issues or have any questions when using PACE, please email us at <figures@plos.org>. Please note that Supporting Information files do not need this step.
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Author response to Decision Letter 0

15 Apr 2020

EDITORIAL DECISION LETTER

Dear Dr. Moore,

Thank you for submitting your manuscript to PLOS ONE. After careful consideration, we feel that it has merit but does not fully meet PLOS ONE's publication criteria as it currently stands. Therefore, we invite you to submit a revised version of the manuscript that addresses the points raised during the review process.

We would appreciate receiving your revised manuscript by Apr 11 2020 11:59PM. When you are ready to submit your revision, log on to <https://www.editorialmanager.com/pone/> and select the \'Submissions Needing Revision\' folder to locate your manuscript file.

If you would like to make changes to your financial disclosure, please include your updated statement in your cover letter.

To enhance the reproducibility of your results, we recommend that if applicable you deposit your laboratory protocols in protocols.io, where a protocol can be assigned its own identifier (DOI) such that it can be cited independently in the future. For instructions see: <http://journals.plos.org/plosone/s/submission-guidelines#loc-laboratory-protocols>

A. We enthusiastically endorse the goal of making project records public. All of the materials, pre-registrations, and data are saved online at the paper's OSF site: DOI 10.17605/OSF.IO/J5VPE.

Please include the following items when submitting your revised manuscript:

A rebuttal letter that responds to each point raised by the academic editor and reviewer(s). This letter should be uploaded as separate file and labeled \'Response to Reviewers\'.

B. We have done so.

A marked-up copy of your manuscript that highlights changes made to the original version. This file should be uploaded as separate file and labeled \'Revised Manuscript with Track Changes\'.

An unmarked version of your revised paper without tracked changes. This file should be uploaded as separate file and labeled \'Manuscript\'.

C. We have done so.

Please note while forming your response, if your article is accepted, you may have the opportunity to make the peer review history publicly available. The record will include editor decision letters (with reviews) and your responses to reviewer comments. If eligible, we will contact you to opt in or out.

D. Thanks. We would gladly share the article's review history publicly.

REVIEWER 1

Review for the paper entitled 'Overprecision increases subsequent surprise'

Thank you for letting me review this exciting and relevant paper. I believe the authors have investigated a relevant topic in three rigorous studies. Their results show that overprecision increases surprise and reduces subsequent confidence. Although I think this research is important I have some concerns before the results can be published.

Major concerns:

1\. My most important concern about the results that are reported in this paper is their external validity. All studies use abstract tasks to measure overprecision and I am not convinced that the results would hold for decisions that have personal consequences for the decision-maker. People in your studies had no incentive to guess the weight of people right. However, people who make overprecise predictions about their future income will experience personal consequences of this judgment. Similarly, managers who have to predict financial losses of their firm will probably experience personal consequences of a wrong judgment. Having said that, I also guess that people will put more thought into judgments that have personal consequences for them which will affect their subsequent surprise. Hence, before I can trust the presented results, I would like to see their external validity and see if this "sensible pattern" holds for (more) realistic settings.

E. We concede that our research contexts might not capture all the high-stakes contexts in which professionals' confidence judgments might matter. We are entirely sympathetic to this concern, and acknowledge it now in the paper's discussion. However, no one study can adequately capture the wide variety of decision contexts in which ex-ante confidence judgments might be followed by surprising evidence. Our studies, like other laboratory experiments, provide more control and clear causal identification than apparent similarity to everyday decisions. The obvious benefit is that we can make clear causal claims. The reviewer notes the greater stakes in some everyday decisions, which might increase attention or effort. But we also see the possibility that higher stakes could impede learning when, for instance, belief revision might introduce cognitive dissonance. The paper now suggests that these might be worthy topics for future research.

2\. You state that "When something unexpected happens, it receives more attention and longer gaze \[...\]." As most people are uncertainty averse, they try to avoid or diminish uncertainty or the unexpected. Hence, I would argue that people would like to engage in deliberate consideration, especially for epistemic questions, to exactly avoid to be surprised for situations of personal relevance. In your weight guessing task, some people might not think systematically about cues that would give them the correct answer, but would just make guesses based on unspecific cues. Did you check participants' time to give their answers or ask them about how they guessed the weight of the strangers?

F. We agree that it is worth considering how research participants' inattention, laziness, or stupidity might influence the results. In our case, indifferent subjects who were not trying very hard and did not care much would introduce more noise in their responses. This should impair our ability to find any relationship between certainty, accuracy, and surprise. The fact that we do find consistent effects should assuage this concern to some degree. However, prompted by this concern, we went back and looked at how long participants had taken to complete the survey. This measure does not moderate the relationship we observe between confidence, accuracy, and surprise.

3\. Can you really compare the tasks of your studies? The probability distributions in the three tasks used is very different and I guess surprise is lower when you are correct in a coin flip compared to when you are correct in the bingo task or the weight guessing task. Similarly, you measure overprecision AND surprise differently. Why did you use 1-100 in Study 1 and 1 to 7 scales in Study 2 to measure suprise?

G. We introduced these variations in an attempt to address some of the same generalizability concerns you raised in your point (2) above. We wanted to see that our effect was not dependent on these trivial choices in experimental design. Of course, there are many other features of our research paradigms that we could have varied, but we were limited in the number of variations we could introduce and still preserve enough consistency in our approach that the studies built on each other.

Why did you not use the surprise subscale from PANAS-X?

H. We were not aware of the surprise subscale of the PANAS-X. Thank you for bringing it to our attention. We would note that the surprise subscale just includes three items: amazed, surprised, astonished. We assessed the most relevant of the three.

Related to that, your study design seems quite straightforward; is it possible that participants guessed the purpose of the study and give answers that conform with your hypotheses? Did you ask participants if they knew about the purpose of the study (and control for that)?

I. It is indeed possible that, participants who guessed our purpose, might have helpfully tried to confirm our hypotheses. It is also possible that devious participants might have intentionally tried to contradict what they thought we expected of them. As it happens, we did have a question at the end of Study 3 that asked, "What do you think this survey was about?" Three (2% of) participants mentioned surprise. Most participants guessed something like, "How we estimate and our confidence." We doubt that participants' abilities to intuit our hypotheses exerted a meaningful role on our results.

Although I am no opponent of using MTurk for data collection, it would be interesting to describe your samples in a bit more detail (gender, age, ethnicity, profession etc.) and possibly also include some control variables in your analyses (at least in Study 1 because it is correlational).

J. We have added some demographic details to the paper for studies 2 and 3, where we collected it. However, we are reluctant to conduct subset analyses or testing for moderation in the absence of a theory predicting its relevance.

4\. I am missing some explanations why surprise does not reduce overprecision. Why should we care that overprecision leads to surprise if we don't know which consequences surprise has for overprecision or any other (personally relevant) decision? It is possible that not surprise, but another emotion, for example, regret, could be a corrective to reduce overprecision. People may want to avoid feeling regret when finding out that their initial judgment was wrong and regret anticipation could reduce overprecision. This is just an hypothesis, but it would be interesting to test this (in a realistic setting).

K. We do not disagree that this would be worth testing, especially given our failure to find consistent effects of surprise on subsequent confidence.

Minor comments:

1\. A more detailed overview of how overprecision is measured in extant research would be helpful in judging if you apply and compare the relevant measures for overprecision.

L. Thanks for this encouragement. We have added more detail on approaches to measuring overprecision to the paper's introduction.

2\. Did the photographs show the full body or only faces?

M. The photographs showed the full body, as the revised manuscript now clarifies. All the photos and verbatim copies of the study stimulus materials are available on the study's OSF web site.

3\. In Study 2, you used 10 questions per domain? Did you (quasi) randomize the questions or blocks of questions?

N. Yes, there were ten bingo ball questions and ten weight-guessing questions. We randomized the order of bingo vs. weight blocks and also randomized question order within each block. The revised manuscript makes this fact clear.

REVIEWER 2

The idea that greater confidence will produce greater surprise (if incorrect) would seem to be a fairly intuitive thing. The manuscript in its current form doesn't seem to build a very strong rationale for the research other than nobody else has done it before.

O. We take this concern seriously; the fact that no one has done it before is a poor reason to conduct a study. We have removed it from our paper. Our paper attempts to honestly present the theoretical questions the motivated our approach. We wanted to investigate an important implication of the research suggesting the ubiquity of overprecision in judgment: frequent surprise. The revised manuscript clarifies this motive.

Arguably, however, a number of studies in the hindsight bias literature have already demonstrated the relationship being tested in this paper (e.g., Ash, 2009; Choi & Nisbett, 2000; Pezzo, 2003). In these studies participants predict the likelihood of an outcome; those whose predictions were most "off" were found to be most surprised. Inherent in a likelihood judgment is a statement of confidence. If person A predicts a 90% chance that the home team will win, she is more confident than person B who predicts only a 60% chance. As such she will be more surprised if the team loses. The authors' use of distance of participants' estimate from the true value as a measure of confidence is consistent with this idea. (Note however, that hindsight bias per se can get convoluted and doesn't always give the mirror image of surprise). In any case, the manuscript would benefit from an expanded introductory section on the extant literature on surprise, including some of the work by Rainer Reisenzein, mention the hindsight literature, and how this research moves beyond that, and should address theoretical differences between their different measures of confidence.

P. We appreciate this encouragement and have taken you up on your invitation to address the hindsight bias literature in our introduction.

STUDY 1

Study 1 has some inconsistencies in its data reporting. The manuscript says N = 430, but t-tests give 451 degrees of freedom. The data set provided on the OSF website is a "tall" data set (typical of multilevel modeling) with what should be 5 rows per subject. However, the total number of rows (N = 2240) divided by 5 = 448. A quick check of unique IDs also yields 448. Also, 6 of the 2240 rows have missing data. Finally, the manuscript says that 37% of the guesses were correct (which is consistent with the OSF data set), but the supplemental material says 35%. These inconsistencies need to be cleared up.

Q. We salute your thoroughness! Thank you for caring enough to help us get these details right. We have reviewed and resolved the inconsistencies you identified. This led us to re-run the analyses. This time we did it in R, so that we could share the analysis code (originally the analyses had been conducted in SPSS). These corrections entailed a corrected data file and analysis code which we have posted to the paper's OSF site.

A much bigger problem is that the column marked "correct" in the OSF data set is not consistent with the description in the method. The method says that a guess was marked correct if it was within 10lbs of the actual weight. Although the actual weights aren't shown in the data set, we would expect the range of guesses that are correct (for any given photograph) to be 20lbs (i.e., +/- 10 lbs). Assuming that everyone saw the same photo in a given "round" (I confirmed this by examining the Qualtrics survey) here are the highest and lowest weight guesses for each of the five pictures. Remember, these are just from people marked correct in the OSF data set:

Round 1: Low guess = 150, High guess = 265

Round 2: Low guess = 120, High guess = 210

Round 3: Low guess = 95, High guess = 170

Round 4: Low guess = 120, High guess = 195

Round 5: Low guess = 105, High guess = 180

Clearly something is amiss here. No matter what the true weights are, these all have ranges much greater than 20lbs. As a double check, I inspected everyone, including those who were marked incorrect, and the ranges get even larger (as would be expected), and include some clear typos (e.g., weight estimates below 50lbs). I don't see anything in the supplemental materials about cleaning any of this data.

I found the true weights in the Qualtrics survey and recalculated the correctness variable. Of the 2240 cases 35.9% were marked correct, but and most important, the original and the newly calculated "correct" columns are completely unrelated (kappa = .09).

The good news is that when you calculate the correlation between surprise and confidence (broken down by correctness, and using the proper "correct" variable), the simple bivariate correlations make a heck of a lot more sense:

r (incorrect) = .40 r (correct) = - 39. Exactly as you would expect.

R. We cannot thank you enough for your thoroughness. By taking the time and doing the hard work to actually dig in to our data, you helped us identify a coding error. We are so grateful to have identified this in the review process. The revised manuscript corrects this error, and we have posted corrected data files to the project's OSF site.

STUDIES 2 and 3

The data sets for Studies 2 and 3 seem fine, near as I can tell (although I did not look closely). The method for all three studies should be fleshed out more (e.g., exact wording of the confidence interval question).

S. We have supplied it.

I found myself often having to refer to the supplemental materials for basic information. The existing method section also has some unnecessary repetition that can be removed to make room for more of these details.

T. In the revision, we have done our best to remove redundancies.

Overall, the presentation of the results is somewhat disorganized. A number of results are presented outside the context of the multilevel modeling and then again repeated within the modeling context (e.g., the main effect of question type). For example, at the top of p.10 a breakdown of the correct x confidence interaction is given before mentioning the interaction (and before mentioning MLM). Then the interaction is mentioned, and then essentially the same breakdown is given (with the exact same results and p-values repeated!).

U. Thanks for helping us identify these redundancies. We have sought to eliminate them.

All three studies suffer from this problem. I think the manuscript would benefit from inclusion of a complete table with the results of all analyses in each study

V. Thank you for this suggestion. We have done as you suggest. The table doesn't quite include every single analysis, since we wanted to honor your encouragement to avoid redundancy. But it includes what we think are the key results.

Does distance from the true value (or confidence) treated as an individual difference variable (averaged across the 5 pictures for any given person) predict surprise at level 2? I think you can examine cross level interactions as well. Since you are using a random slopes approach (which I assume you tested for, and again should report) you might as well see what predicts the slope for any given person by examining level 2 predictors.

W. Thanks for this suggestion. Aggregated at the individual level, we find that surprise and confidence are unreliably correlated. In Study 1, the correlation is r (443) = .17, p \< .001. However, in Study 2, the correlation is r (113) = -.02, p = .83. And in Study 3, the correlation is r (149) = .01, p = .93. We have little reason to think that the results from Study 1 are any more useful or informative than those from Studies 2 and 3. We are reluctant to add these analyses to the paper for several reasons. First, the inconsistency across studies undermines our faith that this is a reliable effect worth report. Second, we are not convinced that they meaningfully contribute to the paper's main point. Third, as a post-hoc analysis we worry about interpretation and setting the right significance threshold.

Study 2 uses a very different criterion for correctness (50% confidence interval) vs that of Studies 1 and 3 ("Is the given answer within +/- 10 lbs of the correct answer"), and the implications are never really discussed in the manuscript. In Study 3, the criterion for correct guessing of quarter flips seems a bit arbitrary. A "pilot" test could determine how many flips "off" most students would require before they considered their guess to be wrong. In general I wonder if the participants would agree with the definition of correctness and if there are individual differences. At least discuss this.

X. Thanks for highlighting different correctness criteria across studies. You have correctly identified the fact that most any criteria will, to some extent, be arbitrary. We have added a passage discussing this issue to the paper's introduction.

From supplemental material (p. 2) "Our main hypothesis was that the distance of the participants' estimate from the true weight would predict their reported surprise, even when being correct was factored in to the model." I thought the interaction with correctness was the key prediction. This sounds like a main effect which is not what you\'re predicting.

Y. It is not clear to us what document you are referring to here. We could not find the text you quote in the main manuscript, the pre-registration, or Study 2's results write-up posted on OSF. We pre-registered our plan to test for the interaction in our Hypothesis 2: "When people are wrong, they will report more surprise (ex post) the more confident they were (ex ante); however, when people are right, they will report less surprise (ex post) the more confident they were (ex ante)."

Further, the title suggests that it is overprecision (which I thought - perhaps incorrectly - always required the use of a confidence interval) was key, not distance, and of course, there is the more standard "how confident are you?" rating. The manuscript doesn't distinguish between these 3 in any important theoretical way.

Z. Thank you for encouraging us to clarify these methodological issues. The revised manuscript does so.

It is confusing to include Figure 1 in its current location. It is also referenced following a sentence that doesn't seem to apply: "The greater the distance between guesses and the truth, the more surprise they reported, β= .77, t(380) = 7.20, p\< .001. See Figure 1." Figure 1 predicts surprise from confidence, not distance of the guess from truth.

AA. Thanks for pointing this out. We have corrected it.

Further, it says that the values are standardized "by z-scoring within each study" Are these z-scores based on the grand mean or on each individual across the five trials? The latter might cause issues by making a person whose lowest surprise rating was 20 comparable to a person whose lowest surprise rating was, say 60.

BB. Thank you for pointing out this ambiguity. We have clarified now in Figure 1's caption: we used the grand mean.

The manuscript should probably include inclusion exclusion criteria for mTurk. Number of HITS, % approved, did you restrict identical (mTurk) IDs, did you check for identical GeoLocation (it's a pain, but particularly if you required a low \#HITs and low approval rating (e.g., 90% or lower), you can get a lot of garbage.

CC\. Thanks for the encouragement to include this information. We have added what we have. We did not check for redundant geolocations.
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PLOS ONE

Dear Dr. Moore,

Thank you for submitting your revised manuscript to PLOS ONE. Both reviewers were satisfied with your responses and recommended a few additional, minor improvements. I am grateful to both reviewers for their diligant and fast responses. We invite you to submit a revised version of the manuscript that addresses the points raised during the review process.

We would appreciate receiving your revised manuscript by Jun 06 2020 11:59PM. When you are ready to submit your revision, log on to <https://www.editorialmanager.com/pone/> and select the \'Submissions Needing Revision\' folder to locate your manuscript file.

If you would like to make changes to your financial disclosure, please include your updated statement in your cover letter.

To enhance the reproducibility of your results, we recommend that if applicable you deposit your laboratory protocols in protocols.io, where a protocol can be assigned its own identifier (DOI) such that it can be cited independently in the future. For instructions see: <http://journals.plos.org/plosone/s/submission-guidelines#loc-laboratory-protocols>

Please include the following items when submitting your revised manuscript:

A rebuttal letter that responds to each point raised by the academic editor and reviewer(s). This letter should be uploaded as separate file and labeled \'Response to Reviewers\'.A marked-up copy of your manuscript that highlights changes made to the original version. This file should be uploaded as separate file and labeled \'Revised Manuscript with Track Changes\'.An unmarked version of your revised paper without tracked changes. This file should be uploaded as separate file and labeled \'Manuscript\'.

Please note while forming your response, if your article is accepted, you may have the opportunity to make the peer review history publicly available. The record will include editor decision letters (with reviews) and your responses to reviewer comments. If eligible, we will contact you to opt in or out.

We look forward to receiving your revised manuscript.

Kind regards,

Philipp D. Koellinger, Ph.D.

Academic Editor

PLOS ONE

\[Note: HTML markup is below. Please do not edit.\]

Reviewers\' comments:

Reviewer\'s Responses to Questions

**Comments to the Author**

1\. If the authors have adequately addressed your comments raised in a previous round of review and you feel that this manuscript is now acceptable for publication, you may indicate that here to bypass the "Comments to the Author" section, enter your conflict of interest statement in the "Confidential to Editor" section, and submit your \"Accept\" recommendation.

Reviewer \#1: All comments have been addressed

Reviewer \#2: All comments have been addressed

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

2\. Is the manuscript technically sound, and do the data support the conclusions?

The manuscript must describe a technically sound piece of scientific research with data that supports the conclusions. Experiments must have been conducted rigorously, with appropriate controls, replication, and sample sizes. The conclusions must be drawn appropriately based on the data presented.

Reviewer \#1: (No Response)

Reviewer \#2: Yes

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

3\. Has the statistical analysis been performed appropriately and rigorously?

Reviewer \#1: Yes

Reviewer \#2: Yes

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

4\. Have the authors made all data underlying the findings in their manuscript fully available?

The [PLOS Data policy](http://www.plosone.org/static/policies.action#sharing) requires authors to make all data underlying the findings described in their manuscript fully available without restriction, with rare exception (please refer to the Data Availability Statement in the manuscript PDF file). The data should be provided as part of the manuscript or its supporting information, or deposited to a public repository. For example, in addition to summary statistics, the data points behind means, medians and variance measures should be available. If there are restrictions on publicly sharing data---e.g. participant privacy or use of data from a third party---those must be specified.

Reviewer \#1: Yes

Reviewer \#2: Yes

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

5\. Is the manuscript presented in an intelligible fashion and written in standard English?

PLOS ONE does not copyedit accepted manuscripts, so the language in submitted articles must be clear, correct, and unambiguous. Any typographical or grammatical errors should be corrected at revision, so please note any specific errors here.

Reviewer \#1: Yes

Reviewer \#2: Yes

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

6\. Review Comments to the Author

Please use the space provided to explain your answers to the questions above. You may also include additional comments for the author, including concerns about dual publication, research ethics, or publication ethics. (Please upload your review as an attachment if it exceeds 20,000 characters)

Reviewer \#1: Thank you very much for your thorough answers to my comments and the according revisions you have made to the paper. I still have a few comments left that will hopefully further improve the paper:

\- For Study 1, you report an attention test that was done right after participants have received the instructions. I would have wished that the attention test was rather later in your study to check if participants were attentive throughout the study. What you describe as attention test appears more like a check if participants have read and understood the instructions which is of course also important.

\- From your answer J. I take it that you didn't collect demographic details from your sample in Study 1. If so, please state this in the Method for Study 1.

\- For Study 2, you seem to have collected demographic information for your sample, but you don't report the gender of the participants. Please check if you really did not collect information about participants' gender.

\- In Table 1, please report p-values for the correlation coefficients. I also think the position of Figure 1 and Table 1 within the text for Study 1 is a bit out of place. I would suggest to either place it at the end of the chapter "present research" or after having presented all three studies in detail.

\- In your results and discussion for Study 3 on p. 17 you write: "Were participants as surprised as they predicted they should be? In order to test this, we employed two independent-samples t-tests to account for the repeated measures design, comparing the predicted surprise for a correct answer to a subsequent correct answer's surprise, and comparing the predicted surprise for an incorrect answer to a subsequent incorrect answer's surprise." Shouldn't this be a DEPENDENT t-test?

\- In your general discussion on p. 21 about the "utility of surprise", I'd like to see more concrete links to current literature and more precise suggestions for future research, e.g., which specific moderators may be promising to include in future studies?

Reviewer \#2: The manuscript is much improved. The increased detail in the method is greatly appreciated. The inclusion of the surprise and hindsight sections really help too. Except for a few very minor things, I think the manuscript is ready to go, and I look forward to citing it in the future.

Minor Things:

1\. Table 1 is MUCH better. You might want to change Study 1 to be consistent with the other two \"Weights - right\" and \"Weights - wrong\" instead of \"When right\" and \"When wrong\"

2\. I\'d love to see more of a rationale for including the prediction of surprise in the intro to Study 3

3\. I think a bit more distinction between (confidence predicting surprise) and (surprise at t-1 predicting confidence) is in order in the intro or general discussion. The latter sort of pops up out of nowhere, and then quickly disappears. Related to this, the last sentence and second to last sentence before the general discussion seem a bit at odds with one another. Maybe replacing \"In short\" with \"Nevertheless\" would do the trick?

4\. Study 3 doesn\'t appear to test for the condition x correct interaction, although I may have missed it.

5\. My reference to the supplemental material (your reply \"Y\") was incorrect. It was in Study 1, not Study 2 that I saw this passage. I think the same question applies though.

That\'s it!

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

7\. PLOS authors have the option to publish the peer review history of their article ([what does this mean?](https://journals.plos.org/plosone/s/editorial-and-peer-review-process#loc-peer-review-history)). If published, this will include your full peer review and any attached files.

If you choose "no", your identity will remain anonymous but your review may still be made public.

**Do you want your identity to be public for this peer review?** For information about this choice, including consent withdrawal, please see our [Privacy Policy](https://www.plos.org/privacy-policy).

Reviewer \#1: Yes: Prof. Dr. Theresa Treffers

Reviewer \#2: No

\[NOTE: If reviewer comments were submitted as an attachment file, they will be attached to this email and accessible via the submission site. Please log into your account, locate the manuscript record, and check for the action link \"View Attachments\". If this link does not appear, there are no attachment files to be viewed.\]

While revising your submission, please upload your figure files to the Preflight Analysis and Conversion Engine (PACE) digital diagnostic tool, <https://pacev2.apexcovantage.com/>. PACE helps ensure that figures meet PLOS requirements. To use PACE, you must first register as a user. Registration is free. Then, login and navigate to the UPLOAD tab, where you will find detailed instructions on how to use the tool. If you encounter any issues or have any questions when using PACE, please email us at <figures@plos.org>. Please note that Supporting Information files do not need this step.

10.1371/journal.pone.0227084.r004
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Reviewer \#1

Thank you very much for your thorough answers to my comments and the according revisions you have made to the paper. I still have a few comments left that will hopefully further improve the paper:

\- For Study 1, you report an attention test that was done right after participants have received the instructions. I would have wished that the attention test was rather later in your study to check if participants were attentive throughout the study. What you describe as attention test appears more like a check if participants have read and understood the instructions which is of course also important.

A. Thanks for noting this issue. Obviously, there are tradeoffs here. One reason to put the attention check before any experimental treatments or manipulations is to reduce concerns with differential attrition. That is, if the attention check comes late in the study, then it is possible that it induces differential drop-out rates correlated with the independent variable and therefore impairing the exogeneity of the experimental manipulation and undermining random assignment to condition.

\- From your answer J. I take it that you didn't collect demographic details from your sample in Study 1. If so, please state this in the Method for Study 1.

B. Correct. We have done as you suggest.

\- For Study 2, you seem to have collected demographic information for your sample, but you don't report the gender of the participants. Please check if you really did not collect information about participants' gender.

C. We did indeed collect gender data in Study 2. We have added the gender breakdown to the study's reported methods.

\- In Table 1, please report p-values for the correlation coefficients. I also think the position of Figure 1 and Table 1 within the text for Study 1 is a bit out of place. I would suggest to either place it at the end of the chapter "present research" or after having presented all three studies in detail.

D. We have moved Figure 1 and Table 1 to after the presentation of Study 3 and added asterisks reflecting the statistical significance of correlation coefficients.

\- In your results and discussion for Study 3 on p. 17 you write: "Were participants as surprised as they predicted they should be? In order to test this, we employed two independent-samples t-tests to account for the repeated measures design, comparing the predicted surprise for a correct answer to a subsequent correct answer's surprise, and comparing the predicted surprise for an incorrect answer to a subsequent incorrect answer's surprise." Shouldn't this be a DEPENDENT t-test?

E. Good catch! Those are, in fact, paired t-tests, as the revised manuscript now makes clear.

\- In your general discussion on p. 21 about the "utility of surprise", I'd like to see more concrete links to current literature and more precise suggestions for future research, e.g., which specific moderators may be promising to include in future studies?

F. Thanks for this encouragement. We have elaborated on opportunities for future research.

 

Reviewer \#2

The manuscript is much improved. The increased detail in the method is greatly appreciated. The inclusion of the surprise and hindsight sections really help too. Except for a few very minor things, I think the manuscript is ready to go, and I look forward to citing it in the future.

Minor Things:

1\. Table 1 is MUCH better. You might want to change Study 1 to be consistent with the other two \"Weights - right\" and \"Weights - wrong\" instead of \"When right\" and \"When wrong\"

G. Good suggestion. We have done so.

2\. I\'d love to see more of a rationale for including the prediction of surprise in the intro to Study 3

H. That's easy. We have elaborated on our reasoning in Study 3's method section.

3\. I think a bit more distinction between (confidence predicting surprise) and (surprise at t-1 predicting confidence) is in order in the intro or general discussion. The latter sort of pops up out of nowhere, and then quickly disappears.

I. Thanks for this suggestion. We have highlighted the value of this test in the introduction where we describe the motivations behind each study's design.

Related to this, the last sentence and second to last sentence before the general discussion seem a bit at odds with one another. Maybe replacing \"In short\" with \"Nevertheless\" would do the trick?

J. Done.

4\. Study 3 doesn\'t appear to test for the condition x correct interaction, although I may have missed it.

K. Thanks for asking about the interaction in Study 3. Given the results of Studies 1 and 2, and given Study 3's replicated reversal, in which the correlation between ex-ante confidence and ex-post surprise flips from -.27 (p \< .001) for correct predictions to .11(p \< .001) for incorrect predictions, we believe a test of the interaction is superfluous.

5\. My reference to the supplemental material (your reply \"Y\") was incorrect. It was in Study 1, not Study 2 that I saw this passage. I think the same question applies though.

L. Thanks for encouraging us to test for the interaction in Study 1. It is indeed significant, and we now report it.

10.1371/journal.pone.0227084.r005
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Dear Dr. Moore,

We're pleased to inform you that your manuscript has been judged scientifically suitable for publication and will be formally accepted for publication once it meets all outstanding technical requirements.

Within one week, you'll receive an e-mail detailing the required amendments. When these have been addressed, you'll receive a formal acceptance letter and your manuscript will be scheduled for publication.

An invoice for payment will follow shortly after the formal acceptance. To ensure an efficient process, please log into Editorial Manager at <http://www.editorialmanager.com/pone/>, click the \'Update My Information\' link at the top of the page, and double check that your user information is up-to-date. If you have any billing related questions, please contact our Author Billing department directly at <authorbilling@plos.org>.

If your institution or institutions have a press office, please notify them about your upcoming paper to help maximize its impact. If they'll be preparing press materials, please inform our press team as soon as possible \-- no later than 48 hours after receiving the formal acceptance. Your manuscript will remain under strict press embargo until 2 pm Eastern Time on the date of publication. For more information, please contact <onepress@plos.org>.

Kind regards,

Philipp D. Koellinger, Ph.D.

Academic Editor

PLOS ONE

Additional Editor Comments (optional):

Reviewers\' comments:

Reviewer\'s Responses to Questions

**Comments to the Author**

1\. If the authors have adequately addressed your comments raised in a previous round of review and you feel that this manuscript is now acceptable for publication, you may indicate that here to bypass the "Comments to the Author" section, enter your conflict of interest statement in the "Confidential to Editor" section, and submit your \"Accept\" recommendation.

Reviewer \#1: All comments have been addressed

Reviewer \#2: All comments have been addressed

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

2\. Is the manuscript technically sound, and do the data support the conclusions?

The manuscript must describe a technically sound piece of scientific research with data that supports the conclusions. Experiments must have been conducted rigorously, with appropriate controls, replication, and sample sizes. The conclusions must be drawn appropriately based on the data presented.

Reviewer \#1: Yes

Reviewer \#2: Yes

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

3\. Has the statistical analysis been performed appropriately and rigorously?

Reviewer \#1: Yes

Reviewer \#2: Yes

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

4\. Have the authors made all data underlying the findings in their manuscript fully available?

The [PLOS Data policy](http://www.plosone.org/static/policies.action#sharing) requires authors to make all data underlying the findings described in their manuscript fully available without restriction, with rare exception (please refer to the Data Availability Statement in the manuscript PDF file). The data should be provided as part of the manuscript or its supporting information, or deposited to a public repository. For example, in addition to summary statistics, the data points behind means, medians and variance measures should be available. If there are restrictions on publicly sharing data---e.g. participant privacy or use of data from a third party---those must be specified.

Reviewer \#1: Yes

Reviewer \#2: Yes

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

5\. Is the manuscript presented in an intelligible fashion and written in standard English?

PLOS ONE does not copyedit accepted manuscripts, so the language in submitted articles must be clear, correct, and unambiguous. Any typographical or grammatical errors should be corrected at revision, so please note any specific errors here.

Reviewer \#1: Yes

Reviewer \#2: Yes

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

6\. Review Comments to the Author

Please use the space provided to explain your answers to the questions above. You may also include additional comments for the author, including concerns about dual publication, research ethics, or publication ethics. (Please upload your review as an attachment if it exceeds 20,000 characters)

Reviewer \#1: Thank you for addressing my final comments. I like the final paper very much and believe it makes an important contribution to our knowledge about the consequences of overconfidence.

Reviewer \#2: I did find one typo:

Study 3 invites participants to report how confident they are that the truth will be close \*\*TO\*\* their best guess.

Otherwise, the manuscript appears to be in good shape.

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

7\. PLOS authors have the option to publish the peer review history of their article ([what does this mean?](https://journals.plos.org/plosone/s/editorial-and-peer-review-process#loc-peer-review-history)). If published, this will include your full peer review and any attached files.

If you choose "no", your identity will remain anonymous but your review may still be made public.

**Do you want your identity to be public for this peer review?** For information about this choice, including consent withdrawal, please see our [Privacy Policy](https://www.plos.org/privacy-policy).

Reviewer \#1: Yes: Prof. Dr. Theresa Treffers

Reviewer \#2: Yes: Mark V. Pezzo
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Acceptance letter

Koellinger

Philipp D.

Academic Editor

© 2020 Philipp D. Koellinger

2020

Philipp D. Koellinger

This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the

Creative Commons Attribution License

, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.

17 Jun 2020

PONE-D-19-33924R2

Overprecision Increases Subsequent Surprise

Dear Dr. Moore:

I\'m pleased to inform you that your manuscript has been deemed suitable for publication in PLOS ONE. Congratulations! Your manuscript is now with our production department.

If your institution or institutions have a press office, please let them know about your upcoming paper now to help maximize its impact. If they\'ll be preparing press materials, please inform our press team within the next 48 hours. Your manuscript will remain under strict press embargo until 2 pm Eastern Time on the date of publication. For more information please contact <onepress@plos.org>.

If we can help with anything else, please email us at <plosone@plos.org>.

Thank you for submitting your work to PLOS ONE and supporting open access.

Kind regards,

PLOS ONE Editorial Office Staff

on behalf of

Dr. Philipp D. Koellinger

Academic Editor

PLOS ONE
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